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Abstract
This paper analyzes the assassination of Lord Moyne, the British Resident Minister of the
Middle East, in 1944 by the extremist Jewish group Lehi and the effect the incident has carried
throughout the last sixty eight years in both Britain and Israel. The weight of the memory of the
assassination as well as how terrorism is defined becomes poignant with the 1975 peace
agreement between Egypt and Israel following the Yom Kippur War. With an eye to how Israel
has continued to make the assassination part of its national identity and Britain’s reaction in 2012
with the death of Yitzhak Shamir. Through the lens of this assassination the use of memory and
the definition of terrorism have continued to be reinterpreted by both the governments of Britain
and Israel.
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INTRODUCTION
Much has been written by historians, political scientists and psychologists on the
assassination of Lord Moyne in Cairo, Egypt, in 1944 as well as the effects of terrorism. The
triangle of Great Britain, Palestine and Israel continues to be a hotbed for discussions on postcolonial struggles. Michael Cohen’s political analysis of the assassination of Lord Moyne looks
at the reaction of the British to the assassination. He states that the British Middle East Defense
Committee decided that the assassins of Lord Moyne must be met with the maximum penalty in
order to show that terrorist violence will not be tolerated. The British had to show a strong front
to the Egyptians and Arabs in this area as the principle imperial force in the Middle East.1
Bernard Wasserstein quotes David Ben-Gurion as commenting on the Moyne Assassination: “to
England terrorism like the murder of Lord Moyne is like a fly stinging a lion, but to Jewry it is a
dagger plunged at the heart.”2 According to Bernard Wasserstein there was a fear in London that
the terrorist activity coming out of Palestine was condoned by the Jewish Agency by the very
same people in England who denounced the extremist group’s activities. J. Bowyer Bell said
that Whitehall conceived of the assassination of Lord Moyne as dangerous to the negotiations of
the Zionists with the British. People in the Jewish Agency were afraid that the Jewish violence
and terror in 1944 would result in counterattacks by the British.3
Did the attacks of the hardcore Jewish organization Lehi alone or in combination with
those of the Haganahh and Irgun chase the British from their Palestine Mandate? Are these
activities by terrorists truly part of the national narrative that makes up Israel? Shpiro concludes
1
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that while the Lehi had memorable moments in history there is very little actual evidence that
their terror attacks pushed the British out of Palestine. He makes the point that the Lehi became
much more important to the national narrative of the history of Israel in 1983 when Yitzhak
Shamir became Prime Minister.4 Michael Cohen concludes by quoting Dr. Chaim Weizmann.
Four years after the assassination Weizmann noted that the assassination of Lord Moyne was the
cause for Britain hanging onto the Mandate of Palestine rather than surrender it to the Jews as a
homeland as they had been lobbying for. It gave the British the excuse to continue their
occupation of Palestine.5 While Bell’s article agrees with Shpiro, that the attacks by the Lehi did
not run the British out of Palestine, he points out that the violence did play a large part in the
London decision to leave. The British might have maintained their Mandate of Palestine much
longer had they not been burdened with the continuous necessity of counter-terrorism. The price
they paid was “blood and…’profound moral deterioration’.”6 Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman
mostly discusses the Irgun, as the Lehi was a much smaller group, in terms of whether or not
terrorism was effective in creating the state of Israel. He does give terror tactics credit. Hoffman
brings up the part of terrorism that looks beyond the death toll, and creates resounding ripples.
Governments notice terrorism and terroristic attacks. Hoffman notes that terrorism in pre-state
Israel brought attention to the British occupation of Palestine to the world, which means it has
already started ‘working’.7
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Leo Benjamin and Gerold Frank each published books in the United States, Martyrs in
Cairo: The Trial of the Assassins of Lord Moyne in 1952 and The Deed in 1963, respectively.
Both of these books present a sympathetic retelling of the plight of the Jews against the
oppressive imperialistic British. These two works are products of terroristic tactics, gaining
recognition for a cause as a result of making a shocking violent statement like an assassination.
Donald Neff points out that Israel has been refusing to recognize Hamas as a representative of
the Palestinian people because they use terror tactics and have been pegged as ‘terrorists’ by the
same people who had been considered terrorists in pre-state Israel are now heroes and prime
ministers.8 In Israel, yesterdays terrorists have become today’s freedom fighters. Today’s
Palestinian terrorists probably will be celebrated as their heroes tomorrow.
Terrorism is in the eye of the beholder. The Lehi’s decision to assassinate Lord Moyne in
1944 has gone from being seen as an extremist terror tactic to both the assassins being honored
in Israel as two of the twelve Jews executed and hung by the British. By following the Moyne
assassination in 1944 to the transfer of the assassins’ bodies to Israel in 1975 and their present
standing today, these events become a study in the changing perception of what constitutes
“terrorism”.
THE ASSASSINATION
“BRITISH DIPLOMAT IS SLAIN IN CAIRO: Lord Moyne Shot on Leaving Auto –
Two Assassins, Not Egyptians, Mobbed”.9 These headlines blared across the front page of The
New York Times on November 7, 1944, the day after Lord Moyne, British Resident Minister of
the Middle East, was assassinated. Newspapers around the world reported a high-ranking British
8
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government representative assassinated by two middle-eastern assailants of unknown origin.
Reports appeared in newspapers in several places, including Britain, Australia, Ireland, and the
United States. The Daily News in Perth, Western Australia recounted on November 7, 1944
“Wounded in the throat and stomach, Lord Moyne fell at the steps leading to his home, while his
chauffeur slumped over the car’s steering wheel, apparently killed instantly.”10 The London
Times intimated, “In spite of treatment by blood transfusion and penicillin he [Lord Moyne]
failed to rally after an emergency operation when a bullet was extracted from the abdomen”.11
The Irish Times stated, “The Cairo Government broadcast a formal statement declaring that the
assailants were not Egyptians, and it was learned late last night that the Egyptian Premier has
called a meeting of his cabinet”.12 These details circulated instantly in the fast- paced political
world of World War II.
Newspapers reporting on the incident used many descriptive terms, such as ‘murder’,
‘assassination’ and ‘terrorist act’ to describe Lord Moyne’s untimely end. Each of these
descriptions brings forth different connotations: the one thing these terms have in common is
they are happening to a victim. What constitutes murder? What constitutes an act of
assassination or terrorism? The differences have in the past been labeled based upon who
committed the crime, whether a country has sanctioned the act, and what century the act was
committed in. Historians strive to understand the reasoning behind these types of acts and have
seen the history surrounding the event to be considered useful in this task.
After Israel was recognized as a country in 1948, the assassination of Lord Moyne was
not forgotten. Gerold Frank, an American author, published his book, The Deed, in April 1965
10
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which stirred great emotion and offered detail to the story of the assassination. The last line in
The Deed, before the poetic ending, is “few remember them now.”13 This ending impresses upon
the reader that the assassination had been forgotten by most until Frank’s publication. Revealed
by the New York Times headline, “Cairo Gives Israel Bodies of 2 Jews”14 in June of 1975 proved
that this deed was not buried in distant memory along with the bodies of assassins, Eliahu BetTsouri15 and Eliahu Hakim. The newspaper outlines the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt
which depicted a trade of soldiers that occurred in the United Nations buffer zone after the Yom
Kippur War of 1973. Israel received the bodies of Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim who
were executed in 1944, in exchange for 20 live Arabs who had previously been jailed as
suspected terrorists and enemy agents.16 This act in 1975 and Yitzhak Shamir’s death in 2012
resurrected the memory of Lord Moyne’s assassination. Through a careful study of the
assassination of Lord Moyne and the commemorations of the players in this action through
different time based lenses, we can trace the weight that memory has in this specific instance as
regards to Great Britain and Israel, and how this event has continued to define Yitzhak Shamir.
Taking a look at the participants in the assassination in 1944, Lord Moyne was a
distinguished man and an asset to Great Britain. He was born Walter Edward Guinness in 1880
in Dublin, Ireland. He was politically and militarily active beginning with a career in the South
African Boer War and into the First World War, continuing with distinguished service in the
House of Commons from 1907 to 1931. Moyne was first the Parliamentary Secretary to the
Minister of Agriculture and then became the Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1941 to
1942. He was then appointed the Deputy Resident Minister of State in Cairo from 1942 to 1943,
13
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and finally Minister Resident in Egypt and the British Middle East until 1944.17 Two armed men
surprised Lord Moyne and his chauffeur, Lance Corporal Arthur Fuller, on their return to Lord
Moyne’s residency in Cairo, Egypt on November 6, 1944. Both men were shot at point blank
range. Fuller died instantly. Moyne was wounded and rushed to a hospital, where he died a few
hours later.
The two gunmen attempted an immediate escape on bicycles after they shot Lord Moyne
and executed the driver. The British United Press news agency reported to The London Times on
November 6, 1944, “The two young men who attacked him [Lord Moyne] had their clothes torn
off by angry crowds. Police arrived just in time to prevent a lynching”. An Egyptian constable in
the area tracked both of the assassins down after they managed to escape the mobbing crowd.
The gunmen were captured; one was wounded. Initially the two young men were not identified
and did not proclaim their names or purpose. 18
THE ASSASSINS
The two assassins, Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim, were young men of twenty-three
and seventeen years of age respectively. Being from Tel Aviv and Beirut, both men could
physically pass as either British or Egyptian. Bet-Tsouri originally was a participant in Irgun
Zvai Leumi, a group of extremist Jews who felt it necessary to create, if needed by force, a
Jewish Homeland. He later switched to Lehi, an offshoot of Irgun comprised of some of the same
members with a slightly different outlook to reach the same goal. Hakim had initially been a
member of Lehi, switched to the British Army, and then returned to serve Lehi. He became an
ideal tool for passing arms back and forth between Egypt and Palestine. The cell in Cairo passed
17

Steven Parissien, Assassinated! Assassinations that shook the world: from Julius Caesar to JFK (Britain:
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information to the Lehi group planning the assassination, watching Lord Moyne’s daily moves,
charting when he did use protection of his guards, and the layout of his residence.19
Bet-Tsouri and Hakim volunteered for the assignment in Cairo because they both had
personal experiences of exposure to elements of British rule they found reprehensible. Both
young men were affected by the initial hanging of a Jew in 1938, who was condemned by the
British officials in Palestine for retaliation amid an Arab uprising. Eliahu Hakim was present
when the ship, Patria, moving mostly Jewish immigrants hoping to reach Palestine, was turned
away from the Palestinian shores and pushed to the Indian Ocean instead.20 What they viewed as
punishment reserved for Jews made impressions on these two young soldiers with a cause. These
anti-Jewish incidents were strong motivators for anyone who was Jewish and seeking vengeance
on the British Government at the time exerting colonial rule over the League of Nations mandate
in Palestine.
The assassins were immediately taken for non-Egyptians and secondly for Jews, even
though their identities and purpose had not been admitted upon capture. However, according to
the New York Times report of November 7, a day after the assassination, General Sir Bernard C.
Paget, Commander in Chief in the Middle East, in a reference to the event surrounding Lord
Moyne referred to the assassins as Jewish.21 There is no proof that General Paget had knowledge
of the affiliation of Bet-Tsouri and Hakim to Lehi or any Jewish extremist group, but he could
have been reading the political clues. Previous to this successful assassination, several failed
attempts had been made in Palestine on Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner of the
British Mandate of Palestine, by the Lehi. Three days after being captured in Cairo, the two
19
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assassins broke down and admitted their names as Moshe Cohen and Itzchak Salzman. The
names were false but their admitting that they belonged to Lehi, was correct. The London Times
reported on Thursday, November 9, 1944, “in making their confession the two prisoners said
they were members of the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel Organization, and what they had
done was at the instigation of this organization.”22 The British media, using The London Times,
provided a brief description depicting the origin of the extremist Lehi organization and their
aims: their use of violence to constitute a Jewish State that had to include all of Palestine.23
Noted reactions to the Moyne assassination varied around the world depending upon how
closely people were reading the situation. Many newspapers and commentators did not mourn
Lord Moyne, but rather pondered the political aftermath in Palestine and the Middle East.
Wallace Murray, the United States Director of Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,
commented on the seriousness of the assassination of Lord Moyne: it “serves to point up once
again the underlying instability in the Palestine situation and the potential threat which is thereby
presented to the security of the entire region.”24 This blatant disregard for human life can be
attributed to many factors. The fighting in World War II had many theaters in 1944. The world
was at war, casualty rates were rising in Europe and Japan and the strategic bombing campaign
was taking a lot of lives on the ground and in the air and had recently been initiated in the
Pacific. The squabbling and resulting casualties in Palestine between the Arabs, the Jews and the
British was nothing new; people had been dying since before 1915. Y.S. Brenner, in his article
on the Stern Gang, concludes that “terrorism in Palestine was a reflection of the international

22
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‘terrorism’, lawlessness and disrespect for human life which characterized the 1940s.”25 Death
was still a tragic concept but now also regarded as an ends to a mean. Two reactions to the
assassination of Lord Moyne differed: those of the Zionists, politically advocating for a Jewish
Homeland, and the Prime Minister of Britain, Winston Churchill.
BRITAIN’S REACTION
Winston Churchill lived through the First World War as a Member of Parliament. After
the war he was appointed to the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies with special
responsibilities for the Middle East in 1921. A conference was held in Cairo in 1921 for all
British officials located in the Middle East to discuss and figure out an arrangement that would
allow British control in the newly mandated territories of Palestine and Transjordan in order to
alleviate the tax pressure on British citizens and eventually produce independence for “several
Arab states”. While the conference was occurring, Winston Churchill visited Palestine and was
enchanted and impressed with the cultivation of the land by the Jewish community of Tel Aviv
which sharply contrasted to the surrounding desert.26 The history of Churchill’s interest is
certainly boosted by his stint in the Middle East. Having been involved in the beginning of
Britain’s rule during the post-World War I new British League of Nations Mandate of Palestine
and Transjordan, Churchill would have taken great interest in this sphere of the world.
Being a close personal friend of the late Lord Moyne, Winston Churchill’s reaction was
both political and emotional. They had worked together in London and according to the
newspapers, Churchill took his death hard. Allegedly, Churchill could not speak when he first
heard the news. On November 17 he found his voice again, “he demanded today that the Jewish
25

Y.S. Brenner, “The ‘Stern Gang’ 1940-48,” Middle Eastern Studies 2, no. 1(October 1965): 29,
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community of Palestine- ‘every man, woman and child’- destroy the terrorist elements
responsible for the recent assassination in Cairo of Lord Moyne, British Resident Minister in the
Middle East.”27 Winston Churchill was fierce in his resolve that both the terrorists be located and
ousted from Palestine and the rest of the Jewish population not be punished through suspension
of immigration into Palestine. He feared that a total restriction on Jewish immigration would
result in a combining of both the moderate Zionists with all Jews in opposing the British
Government. Winston Churchill’s marked outrage did result in the Haganah, the Jewish Defense
Force in Palestine, beginning what was dubbed the hunting “saison”, a forceful roundup of
anyone belonging to either Irgun or Lehi, the so-called Jewish terrorist groups. The “saison”
resulted in lots of arrests of Irgun and Lehi members as well as the denouncement of the groups
as “fascists.”28 This self-righteous anger coursing through Churchill stretched to Egypt in the
form of a communication to the British Ambassador in Cairo, Lord Killearn, when the assassin’s
death sentence had yet to be carried out a few months after the trial. He requested a complaint
lodged with the Egyptian Government and threatened disaffection between the British and
Egyptian Government if the death sentence was not carried out.29
Winston Churchill’s speech regarding descriptive terms about his friendship with the
Jews was printed in the New York Times: “If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of
the assassin’s pistol and our labors for the future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of
Nazi Germany, then many like myself would have to reconsider the position we have maintained
so consistently and so long in the past.”30 Churchill’s obvious emotions about the assassination

27
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are very intimately entwined with his political aim of possibly not supporting the Zionist goal of
having a Jewish State. There was one reader whose reaction to Churchill is worth noting. The
New York Times, in its Letters to The Times section from November 23, 1944 printed a letter
written by (The Rev) Jeremiah J Berman. His response to Churchill’s threat:
In its conduct toward Palestine the hands of the British Government have not been clean.
By shutting the doors of the Promised Land in the face of homeless and driven refugees it
has cause tens of thousands of Jews to perish. The British Government cannot pursue a
policy that drives men to desperation and then pretend outraged innocence when
confronted with inevitable consequences of that policy. We cannot fathom the meaning
of Mr. Churchill’s, ‘then many like myself would have to reconsider the position we have
maintained so consistently and so long in the past.’ Does Mr. Churchill imply that he may
be less favorably disposed than he has been heretofore? We are appalled at the
possibility.31
The letter to the editor is a great example of Jewish frustration with the perceived unreliable
British attitude towards the Jewish issues in Palestine. The author of the letter to the editor
resided in the United States, but Churchill’s words had gravity across the ocean.
ZIONIST REACTION
In order to understand the Zionist point of view after the assassination, a brief history of
Zionism may elaborate upon the Jewish Perspective: “Modern Zionism began with the propheticprogrammatic writings of Moses Hess, Judah Alkalai, Zvi Hirsch Kalischer and Theodor Herzl
and the immigration from Russia to Ottoman-ruled Palestine in the 1880s of Jews dedicated to
rebuilding a national home for the Jewish people on their ancient land, the Land of Israel, in
Zionist parlance.”32 The Zionists were determined to create a Jewish Homeland and had been
working towards this goal in a peaceful way. And so, upon hearing of the untimely death of Lord
Moyne, immediately denied any and all involvement: “Zionist leaders…made numerous
31
32
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expressions of horror over the assassination and condemned the terrorists’ policies in Palestine
and elsewhere.”33 The Zionist leaders had been trying to attain the same goal as the terrorist Lehi
and the Irgun, namely a Jewish State in Palestine, albeit in a non-violent manner. The Zionists
were adamant that this assassination delayed the creation of the state of Israel. The New York
Times recorded the president of the World Zionist Organization, Chaim Weizmann, saw the
assassination as a group tragedy: “I have suffered a grievous personal tragedy in this war, when
my son, a flying officer in the RAF, was lost in operations, but it was with a deeper sense of
shock and grief that I heard from the Colonial Office about the murder of Lord Moyne.”34 His
mortification of Moyne’s assassination is not personal like Churchill’s; it is the loss of having
carefully constructed a peaceful image of Zionism to show the world, only to have the act of a
few condemned all Jews as associated with assassins. Weizmann’s grief sounds extreme; after all
his own flesh and blood, his son, was lost forever, but the loss of Lord Moyne had much more of
a universal meaning. With Lord Moyne’s death, the Zionists were distressed that they might lose
all favor with the British who promised support for a Jewish Homeland. Weizmann’s son was
dead, but it was more devastating to Weizmann to think that the Jews may have lost their chance
at a National Homeland.
Prior to Moyne’s assassination, author Ben-Yehuda asserts that prominent authors,
Wasserstein, Bauer, Ayalon and Cohen all stated “the British Cabinet received a report from its
Palestine Committee…the report would have recommended giving to the Jews a state of their
own in Palestine, [which] had been minuted for the Cabinet’s agenda on 3 November 1944…”35
Not proven beyond a shadow of a doubt, however, it was to become a major rallying point for
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the Zionists to condemn, even more so than before, the extremist Lehi and even the Irgun. This
would eventually lead to the hunting “season”, aforementioned, which occurred after the Moyne
assassination. The Haganah, the Jewish militia in Palestine, went on a raid to exterminate, or
lock away, members of Lehi and Irgun. This pitched the more moderate Zionists against the
extremists groups who displayed terroristic tendencies. As Martin Gilbert quotes, “Eliahu
Golomb, the head of the Haganah underground, argued that the struggle was between ‘Zionist
democracy and Jewish Nazism’.”36 More importantly, to the British, the result was not the entire
Jewry of the world uniting with the less extreme Zionists against the British.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is useful to have historical context to fully appreciate what both Britain and Israel were
reacting to. Both Britain and France had been victors in World War I. The Ottoman Empire, on
the side of the defeated Central Powers, had collapsed and its territories had been redistributed.
With the Paris Peace Conference, Britain came in control of both Palestine and Iraq in spite of
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points indicating an interest to see the occupied territories govern
themselves. After the dividing the Middle East, those that resided in the territories were not
accommodated in any fashion with respect to self-determination. Merely looked upon as spoils
of war, not as people with their own rights, the Ottoman territories were not regarded as liberated
and the then popular talk about governing themselves seemed contrary to fact.37 The colonialist
tendencies that had been developed in both France and Britain continued after World War I.
Britain had built an empire through acquiring colonies and holding onto them for centuries. The
usefulness of maintaining Egypt lay in Britain being able to be present in the Middle East,
36
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repairing Palestine and Transjordan as League of Nations trusteeships which was, “…part of the
hallowed area around the Suez Canal…”38 In order for Britain to continue to be a great power,
the country needed to preserve its colonial image-- one of reaching to the four corners of the
globe.
The history of Jewish migration from Europe to Palestine began in the 1880s and
continues to this day. Historians have divided the influx of Jews into waves of migration due to
its unsteady nature over the decades. Anti-Semitism has been a part of the European mindset for
centuries, and as a result there was a common negative image among Christians of Jews. Fears
in Europe had been characterized with the image of Jews as “afraid to fight, exploit [ing] their
neighbors, eternally involved in questionable financial and monetary transaction (and in loaning
at high rates of interest)…despised, degraded, lazy, mean and miserable people.”39 Nachman
Ben-Yehuda argues that Zionism, developed right after the anti-Semitism became viral in Europe
in the late 19th century, and was influenced by nationalism, to help create a new positive image
of Jews. By moving to their own national Jewish Homeland, the image would be one of Jews
fighting for their own homeland and owning their own property.40
The Ottoman Empire was in control of Palestine prior to World War I. The Turks made it
difficult for Jews to immigrate whereas the British, using the 1917 Balfour Declaration, had
pledged to help create a Jewish National Homeland. This steady stream of immigration into the
British Mandate of Palestine after World War I was slowed down by the introduction of the
British White Paper in 1939, which restricted the number of Jewish immigrants allowed into
Palestine. This restriction came at an unfortunate moment in time, when Hitler’s Nazi
38
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Government had begun to legally harass and persecute people of Jewish faith in Germany,
beginning in 1933. The passing of the Nuremberg Laws in Nazi Germany in 1935, which
restricted racial miscegenation, introduced a separate citizenship for Jews that gave them limited
rights, and restricted their economic livelihood, was only the beginning of anti-Semitism legally
realized.41 Feverish desire by Jews to leave Europe intensified as a result of Hitler’s and the Nazi
Government’s persecution, especially after the “Anschluss” of Austria in 1938. Countries
deemed “friendly” for immigration became overwhelmed and began to enforce stricter
immigration laws to stop the influx of Jews.
Starting with the 1917 Balfour Declaration, a letter written in 1917 by British Foreign
Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, the British approved establishing in
Palestine a national home for the Jewish people.42 One of the issues that Jews had with this
declaration, and what makes it so confusing later on in British policy, is that Balfour used the
word ‘in’ implying that the entire state of Palestine would not become the national home for the
Jews, rather it would be a shared territory with the Palestinians. The term ‘national home’ has
also been looked at askance because it was used in lieu of ‘state’. This way the British retained
control over the Middle East. The letter continued to state, “…[Britain] will use their best
endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object [the national home], it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine…”43 The British were careful not to put anything
in writing that they could not change later if their needs so demanded. The second part of the
statement in the Balfour letter announced that the British Government would keep the needs of
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the Palestinian Arabs in mind when trying to place the Jews in Palestine. After World War I the
British realized the advantage of keeping a hand in the Middle East. They enjoyed the luxury of
having a far flung empire through colonies and mandates. After World War I, the British were
on the side of the victors; they still had their colonies which had been established before World
War I. After the war they had even gained new territories in the Middle East. They maintained
control by placing the demands of their empire over everyone else and kept a balance between
the Jews and the Arabs.
The imperialistic British attitude was further evidenced by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of
1916. The British and the French decided to dismember the Ottoman Empire between themselves
before the actual collapse of the Ottoman Empire after 1918. The McMahon Letter, written in
1915, promised to help Hussein Ibn-Ali, the sherif of Mecca, who helped the British war effort.
The British, in turn, promised to reestablish his caliphate. The casual offer to Hussein Ibn-Ali
presented the opposite of what the British had intimated to the Jews who were seeking a national
homeland. By keeping the offers to both sides in mind, the British tried to keep the balance
between the two countering forces in Palestine while trying to keep total control in the region.
These three explicit agreements, the Balfour Declaration, the Sykes-Picot agreement, and the
McMahon letter, came into play during the League of Nations conference of 1920 when the
British were awarded the British Mandate of Palestine by the League of Nations, which went into
effect in 1923.44
The British White Paper, written in 1939, dictated a three part policy: immigration to
Palestine, land in Palestine, and the constitution of the Palestine State. The governing of the state
would not remain in the hands of the British, but would become a joint operation by the Arabs
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and Jews. However, many Arabs rejected this White Paper as they believed the British were
reneging on the McMahon pledge of an Arab State, which the British now felt they could not
uphold. The immigration section of the White Paper allotted a specific quota of Jews to enter
Palestine; 75,000 Jews were allowed to immigrate within the five year period beginning April 1,
1939.45 This is the background to the tragedies of the two ships, Patria and Struma, denied
entrance to Palestinian harbors, actions which resulted in hundreds of Jewish refugee deaths.
Given these tragedies, the hard-core Lehi argued for resisting and terrorizing the British.
HISTORY OF THE LEHI
While the British controlled Palestine under the League mandate, the Jews first created an
underground Jewish militia, the Haganah. Haganah was constructed by the Jews experiencing
Arab mob activity as a result of “whole Arab villages turned on their Jewish neighbors, looting,
burning and killing. The Jews felt that British protection, even in Jerusalem, was grudgingly
given, slow to arrive and often ineffective.”46 These Arab mob attacks on Jews began happening
in 1920/1921. The need the Jews felt for their protection speaks volumes about the British and
their obvious lack of attention to what was happening in their mandate. What began as a small
Jewish protection force for a limited group soon grew to become a larger group of armed force.
When the British took them seriously, Haganah developed a second ‘B’ group. In 1936, more
Arab revolts occurred as well as an Arab strike to show displeasure with the British policy of
allowing more Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine. The British “decided to establish a Jewish
supernumerary police force. In July some twenty two thousand of these special police, Notrim,
were appointed to act as a protective militia for the Jewish settlement and quarters. The force
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soon became a legal cover for the Haganah…”47 The Haganah had become official in the eyes of
the British.
Some of the commanders of Haganah B decided to split off and head their own group, the
Irgun Zeva’I Le’umi (The National Military Organization), also known as IZL, that initially
became active in 1931 and remained so until 1937. They differed from the Haganah. A
Revisionist Movement headed by Vladimir Jabotinsky was the inspiration for the newest group,
the Irgun. After 1937 they decided to “subordinate everything to the struggle against Hitler.”48
Abraham Stern, then a member of the Irgun, disagreed with Irgun’s policy to break off its
activities hampering the British. Stern wanted to go to outright war with the British. It was the
Irgun’s strategy to show solidarity against Hitler and his anti-Semitic actions. They also wanted
to show the British officials they could protect the interest of Palestine. Abraham Stern was left
believing that he should continue to fight the British and their notion of colonialist policies in the
Middle East.49
This resulted in the birth of the “Lochamei Herut Israel”, the Lehi, also called the “Stern
Gang”, named after Abraham Stern. Heller states that “Lehi’s entire raison d’etre lay in the
inactivity of the IZL and its ideological weakness.”50 Stern “maintained that the Jews must not
abandon their activities against British imperialism, which was occupying Palestine and
forbidding entrance to the persecuted Jews of Europe.”51 A poet and a scholar, Stern was born in
Poland in 1907. He moved to Palestine in 1925 and became active in the Irgun. He had adamant
beliefs that included, “the enemy of the Jews…was not Adolf Hitler…Great Britain was the real
47
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oppressor…in common with other totalitarian thinkers, Stern was willing to take any measure to
bring down the tyrant. In common with other powerless groups, he chose the weapon of terror.”52
Stern actively approached the Nazis to propose collaboration between them and the underground
movement of the Jews. In his letter dated November 1, 1940, Stern admitted that he knew Hitler
was looking for an answer to the “Jewish question”. He offered to join forces with the Nazis and
have all the Jews moved to Jerusalem, back to the Land of Israel: “The Irgun knows well the
Reich’s enthusiastic attitude towards Zionist activities within Germany to encourage the Zionist
emigration …”53 He continued to list the mutual interests, the idea of cooperation and the end
goal of establishing a historical Jewish state. Although this action may have sounded quite
absurd, based upon Stern’s beliefs at the time, this idea was not so farfetched; “the Nazis never
occupied the Fatherland, the British did…for them [the Lehi] the symbol of the Holocaust was
not Auschwitz but the ships bearing Jews which the British turned away from Palestine.”54
Abraham Stern firmly believed the British were the enemy of the Jews, not the Nazis. He
then viewed political decisions, such as the refusal to let Jewish refugees enter Palestine on the
ships Struma and Patria, and legal documents like the British White Paper, to be actual evidence
that the British were the enemy. Stern believed in the state of Israel as a real possibility but only
when the British withdrew from Palestine completely. In his extremist approach, Stern was
adamant about ridding Palestine of their British oppressors through any means necessary. The
London Times commented, after the Moyne assassination, “the rise of Jewish terrorism in
Palestine is due to the belief, firmly held by certain sections of the younger Jews hailing from
central and eastern Europe, that assassination and sabotage are the only weapons by which
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Britain can be forced to abandon the White Paper of 1939 and to make Palestine ‘as Jewish as
England is English’.”55
Once the British were established in Palestine, the Jews began to immigrate in large
numbers. There were five waves of immigration that occurred before the State of Israel came
into existence; the largest recorded number of 145,000 Jews arrived from 1930-1939. These
waves of immigrations were prompted by many different factors at the time, resulting in a slow
but gradual influx of Jews.56 The legalized mistreatment of Jews in Germany and the spreading
of the Nazi hatred to the territories captured by the Nazi Government, eventually leading to the
Holocaust, drastically sped up emigration from Europe.
One of the ways Jews fled Europe was by ship. Two refugee ships share similar tragic
stories: the Patria and the Struma. Having a problem with refugees from Europe illegally
attempting to enter Palestine, despite the British quota policy, the British had begun to turn away
ships. The Milos, Pacific and Atlantic were ships carrying around 3,600 Jewish refugees in
November of 1940; the refugees had boarded with the consent of the Gestapo. Sir Harold
MacMichael, the fifth British High Commissioner for Palestine, refused to let the refugees stay
and find a home in Palestine. He ordered 1,770 refugees that had disembarked to turn around and
board the Patria, in addition to those aboard the Atlantic, which had shown up in Palestine a
couple days after the other two. MacMichael planned to remove the Jewish refugees, either to be
deported to Mauritius or to be kept aboard in a floating prison-like camp. Haganah, the Jewish
militia, decided to hit the ship in a manner to render it unable to sail. Their intentions were to halt
MacMichael, to have this ship turned around and the Jewish refugees deported. Tragically, the
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hole the Haganah blew to the ship was much too large, the ship sank and there were casualties of
more than two hundred refugees who perished. MacMichael did not allow the remaining
refugees to stay in Palestine.57
The Struma experienced a similar fate to the Patria. These incidents are considered
comparable because the Jewish refugee deaths were again a result of enforced British
immigration policy to Palestine. The Struma sailed from Rumania, a Black Sea port, in
December of 1942; its passengers included 769 Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi controlled Europe.
Destined for Palestine, the ship was halted and stranded in a Turkish port, never to enter
Palestine territory on MacMichael’s orders. “The Turkish authorities became impatient and on
February 23, 1942, towed the ship into the Black Sea and left it there, without food, water, fuel
and with a broken engine. There she was probably torpedoed by a Russian submarine and sunk.
Only one passenger survived.”58 Sir Harold MacMichael was held “accountable” for the
countless Jewish refugee deaths occurring while he was upholding British Policy of limited
immigration of Jews into Palestine. The Haganah, as well as another militant Jewish group, the
Lehi or Stern Gang, continued to blame MacMichael and British policy for the refugee tragedies.
Several attempts were made on MacMichael’s life.
YITZHAK SHAMIR
After the British police shot and killed Abraham Stern in 1942, a member of the Lehi,
Yitzhak Shamir, like Stern born a Jew in Poland, took over the leadership of the small group of
Jewish extremists. Yitzhak Yezernitsky, Shamir’s original name; his name change coincided
with him receiving news of his family from Poland. Both his parents and sisters had escaped the
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initial deportations from Rozhnoi in November 1942. Unfortunately, one sister and his father,
Shlomo, turned to some childhood friends for protection and both were shot. His mother and
other sister were placed in the death camp Treblinka and executed. Yitzhak never used the name
Yezernitsky again; he picked the name “Shamir” which in Hebrew means a partially hard rock,
or according to a legend, a small worm that broke rocks in order to make the Temple.59
Shamir never spoke publically about his family except one time in 1989 at a gathering
honoring Holocaust victims. Originally from Poland, he moved to the British Mandate of
Palestine in 1935 and quickly became a member of Irgun. Shamir found Abraham Stern to be
charismatic, a good speaker and he subscribed to his compelling ideals. So he switched to the
more radical Lehi faction in 1940. As part of the secrecy of being a member of an underground
group, Stern was known as “Yair” and Shamir was known as ‘Michael’, named “after a famed
Irish guerilla named Michael Collins.”60 Stern grew to like Shamir and promoted him quickly to
a position of high command. After Stern’s demise, ‘Michael’ took over the Lehi61 and stressed
the importance of secrecy. This change marked the rebirth of the underground Lehi. Shamir
personally helped plan the decision to assassinate Lord Moyne in Egypt. From his “radical”
perspective Lord Moyne was the highest ranking British official within the grasp of the Lehi and
he had a personal history of holding powerful positions in the British Government that played
influential roles in British policy in Palestine.62 With the assignment of Lord Moyne to the post
of British Minister Resident of the Middle East in 1944, members of Lehi feared that this
decision by the British government was foreshadowing a policy that would be pro-Arab. After
Lord Moyne’s involvement with the restricted immigration policy to Palestine, he is also credited
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with “his speech in the House of Lords on 9 June 1942, when he had spoken of the ‘purity’ of the
Arab race and had denigrated the attempts of the ‘mixed’ Jewish race to establish control over
Palestine…”63 These notions highlighted Lord Moyne as an ideal political target.
THE TRIAL
The trial of Lord Moyne’s assassins exposes their motives and reveals the convictions of
the Lehi. On November 8, 1944, the New York Times wrote that, “it was understood that the
young assailants would be tried in normal process in the Egyptian courts with the Egyptian
Procurer as prosecutor.”64 The trial was handled by the Egyptians instead of the British, which
looked better to the rest of the world not involved in the Middle East. The Egyptian lawyers
representing the two assailants whittled down their argument to one point, “whether political
motives extenuate the taking of human life.” The Egyptian lawyers “…have asked the court to
recognize the distinction between mere murder, [and] assassination for reasons of pure
patriotism.”65 This request, that the event be defined by motives and not by the actual action,
reveals how politicized the assassination was viewed by the assailants and their lawyers. The
defense requested that the case of the two assailants be decided based upon, “that in the mind of
the two Palestinians Lord Moyne represented a symbol and an instrument of British
administration in their native country. That they consider British rule in Palestine as being unjust
to Jewish aspirations. That therefore, their crime was a patriotic act, not murder.”66 The lawyer’s
logic referred to the French penal code; with its differentiation between two types of slayings.
This applied to Egypt because Egyptian law was derived from the French penal code. The
lawyers defending the two Lehi members also brought up examples of political assassinations in
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other countries where defendants were not convicted. The lawyers put together some extenuating
circumstances:
1. The youth and impressionability of Bet-Zuri and Hakim, 2. That they fell under the
influence of the terroristic ‘Stern Gang’ and obeyed its instructions in the belief it was a
patriotic organization seeking to free Palestine from British administration. 3. That their
knowledge of the history of the persecution of the Jews inflamed their minds to a point
where they became willing instruments for an act of revenge.67
Reasoning like the three points presented to the court in hopes of extenuating
circumstances was not surprising given the age of the assailants. The third reason given was the
most relevant-- people in Europe and outside would have some previous knowledge of the
perversion of anti-Semitism. By the fall of 1944 there were plenty of rumors of what was
happening in Germany to the Jews. Nevertheless, by the end of the trial the prosecution ruled
that murder was murder and that murder or killings based on political reasoning held no more
justification than for any other rationalization.68 Both assassins received the supreme penalty for
their actions of the pre-meditated murder of Lord Moyne and the unplanned murder of his driver.
Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim were both convicted for murder and hanged in Cairo on
March 23, 1945. Their bodies were buried in Egypt.
During the trial, the court took issue with allowing Eliahu Hakim and Eliahu Bet-Tsouri
to make public announcements. Under order from the judge presiding over the trial, originally
their pronouncements were not published or covered in any paper for months until January of
1945. In its reporting, the New Orleans Times-Picayune describes the event as the “garbled
version” of the trials. While there were no reprints of the assassin’s speech in Egyptian
newspapers, the court also did not clear the courtroom, so the speech became public knowledge
within hours. The Egyptian government claimed they were fearful of “the courtroom becoming a
67
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forum for dissemination of Sternist ideas”. They were also deeply concerned that disturbances
would break out as a result of statements made in court.”69
Gerold Frank, an American war correspondent commuting back and forth between
Palestine and Egypt, was present in Egypt on the day of the Moyne assassination. He remained in
Egypt to cover the trial and subsequently published a book in 1963, The Deed. Gerold Frank was
deeply moved by the actual deed and the trial. He went as far as retracing the steps of the
assassins from the safe house to the botched escape route; he interviewed everyone he could
locate who was involved. In The Deed, Frank recounts Eliahu Bet-Tsouri’s speech and gives it
much prominence in his account. Frank claimed no association with the Zionists, or their ideas.
Rather he made a sweeping statement denouncing any and all British involvement in Palestine.
While the Zionists were preoccupied with the Balfour Declaration and constantly demanded that
it be honored by the British, Bet-Tsouri challenged the idea that Britain should even be present in
Palestine, saying that it was like having a “stranger” in your house. He even referenced the
murder of Abraham Stern at the hands of British policemen and voiced the notion that the British
committed the murder of Stern and lauded they did it under the rule of law.70
Bet-Tsouri’s impassioned speech, while ordered not to be recorded, nevertheless made an
impression. Gerold Frank documents key elements of the trial, including this speech. At the start
of the trial, Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim both refused the lawyer’s initial plan of
pleading insanity. Once the court commenced, the language of the trial was Arabic, yet the two
Jews on trial requested Hebrew be spoken. The judge stated that Arabic was the official language
to which Bet-Tsouri replied that Hebrew was his official language so a translator had to be
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found. Then, there was a motion from the two men on trial for the trial to be moved to an
international court. The judge simply stated that Lord Moyne and the driver were killed on
Egyptian soil and they would be tried by an Egyptian court. Bet-Tsouri countered with the fact
that he and Hakim were not acting out of hostility towards Egypt but rather were against the
British, to shatter and invalidate their colonialist regime. The judge stated that their case was not
applicable to the boundaries that applied to countries.71 Both the assassination and the
subsequent trial highlighted “the fact that their proud stand in court amplified Lehi’s ideology
and cause worldwide.”72 After the conviction and execution the two young men, Eliahu BetTsouri and Elaihu Hakim, were buried in Cairo in 1945 as murderers, assassins and terrorists.
Gerold Frank’s keen observations as a journalist and his later book have contributed to
preserving this historical moment as well as Lehi’s mission. His sympathetic re-telling of the
events of the 1944 Moyne Assassination, along with his delving into the characters and
motivations of both Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim, elicited some forceful reactions. The
New York Times took a harsh view on The Deed, citing that Gerold Frank’s book “glorifies the
assassination” and even asks if “Gerold Frank [is] forgetting about the Nazis?”73 While a
newspaper from Texas opened their article on The Deed with “If you were a publisher in an
over-crowded book market, would you go for this idea?” and said of the assassination, “The
forgotten case is too remote; and it’s not even a suspense story.”74 While Frank’s book may not
have been popular, it did warrant mention in Yitzhak Shamir’s autobiography. Shamir
referenced the interview he gave Gerold Frank and that the assassination of Lord Moyne had
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been referred to as the ‘deed’ after his book came out.75 The memory of the assassination had
been preserved in Frank’s novel and title.
BODIES EXCHANGE IN 1975
In June of 1975, The New York Times reported the relocating of the bodies of the two
assassins [Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim] from their burial site in Egypt to “lie in state in
Jerusalem tomorrow before internment in the heroes and martyrs section of the Mount Herzl
cemetery.”76 The article was brief and the matter of fact report of The New York Times laid out
the facts surrounding Lord Moyne’s death. The London Times posed a different reaction. On
June 26, 1975 The London Times ran the article, “Israel honours British minister’s assassins.”
The title alone illustrates the effect that the bodies exchanged between Egypt and Israel had on
Britain. The title depicts the tone that this event was designed to have on the British public.
Opening with how the bodies of the assassins were to be honored in Israel furthered the
indignation that is attached to the collective memory of the death and murder of Lord Moyne and
his driver, Lance Corporal Fuller. The British newspaper article discussed the Israeli Ministry of
Education’s treatment of the event. The Israeli Ministry of Education created a pamphlet that
was distributed and read to students in their schools, while they stood in attention, giving an
explanation of who Lord Moyne and the two Eliahus were and why the assassination occurred.77
The article continued with “government involvement has turned what might have passed as a
normal humanitarian gesture after 30 years into a controversial national occasion.”78
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From the London Times, “Britain regrets Israel’s honouring of assassins”, printed two
days after the initial article, the British Ambassador was instructed to inform the Israeli
Government that they were displeased with the way Israel had decided to make this act of
terrorism an act of valor.79 When the bodies were exchanged at the Israeli-Egyptian border in the
United Nations buffer zone it was reported that the United Nations arranged a guard of honour.80
This quickly became a point of contention for the British government as well as the United
Nations whose “officials expressed embarrassment today over reports that the United Nations
had provided a guard of honour for the handing over of the bodies.”81 By the following day the
newspapers were reporting that the United Nations spokesman confirmed that there was no guard
of honor and that the bodies had been treated with traditional military honors but “this would not
have been done, however, if the troops had know whose the bodies were.”82 Nevertheless, the
Israeli Government draped the both of the coffins in the national flag, and had the two Eliahus
“lie in the Jerusalem Hall of Heroism, which commemorates the exploits of Jewish Terrorist
groups against the British during and after the Second World War…the bodies will be reburied
in a section of the military cemetery on Mount Herzl reserved for heroes and ‘martyrs’.”83 In
Israel the memory of the assassination in 1975 was that the assassins were freedom fighters and
martyrs; in Britain they were still viewed as terrorists pure and simple.
The newspapers reported the bodies exchanged between Egypt and Israel as part of the
peace agreement after the Yom Kippur War. There were multiple letters to the editor clearly
supporting the importance of this matter to the public. The London Times ran a letter to the editor
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on June 28, 1975 written by Mr. Andrew Hughes-Onslow, Lord Moyne’s aide-de-camp in 1944.
Hughes-Onslow expressed his sadness and dismay over the deaths of both Lord Moyne and
Lance Corporal Fuller whom he had seen being murdered; he had been the lead witness in the
trial of Eliahu Hakim and Elia Bet-Tsouri. He continued in his letter to address the Israeli
Government’s efforts to honor the assassins including having their bodies lie in state in the Hall
of Heroes. Hughes-Onslow deplores that recently people had forgotten about the “Jewish
terrorism” and had admired Israel for its strength in the Yom Kippur War and “thus it comes as a
shock and with a feeling of sadness to read in your columns of the glorification of these ruthless
assassins.”84
Lord Moyne’s assassination in 1944 was still a sore subject with the British. Yet it was
still celebrated in Israel, even more so in 1975 than in 1944. The national collective memory of
the assassination in both countries was solidified by the exchange of the two Eliahus for 20 Arab
prisoners captured as terrorists and spies. While Britain still mourned the loss of one of their
officials and found the impropriety of the situation to be overwhelming, Israel was strengthening
their national identity through the involvement of their public and the school system.
MEMORIALIZED
Having discussed the personal histories and deaths of both Lord Moyne and the assassins,
as well as the re-internment of Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim; how have these figures been
memorialized? A commemorative plaque posted at the Cairo Cathedral in Egypt is dedicated to
Lord Moyne which was erected in his memory on December 15, 1944.85 Trinity College in
Dublin built a new building, the Moyne Institute of Preventative Medicine, to commemorate the
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life and death of Lord Moyne. His daughter, the Honorable Grania Guinness, was present at the
ceremony in 1950 and laid the foundation stone.86 Lord Moyne was commemorated in both
Egypt and Ireland, respectively the place where he was killed and where he was born.
Conversely, Avraham Stern has graced a postage stamp in Israel as well as has a town
named in his honor in which resides some of the Israeli elite.87 To remember Eliahu Bet-Tsouri
and Eliahu Hakim, Israel has named a street ‘Shnei Eliahu’ after both assassins. This street lies in
Akko, a part of Israel that boasts both Jewish and Arab residents in an area where Arabs were
conquered by Haganah in 1948.88 Perhaps this memory construction serves a dual purpose, it
cements the memory of the two assassins and reminds those residing in the area, a large number
of Palestinians, of the lengths Jews have gone to in order to preserve their national homeland.
Continuing with the notion to create a strong national identity in Israel, in 2009 the
prominent Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the “Education Ministry is introducing a study
unit on the 12 underground fighters who were hanged or committed suicide in prison during the
British Mandate in Palestine [Olei Hagardom].”89 The program was targeted towards eighth and
ninth graders who were to create and compete nationally with projects that show the ideology of
the twelve that perished. Three Lehi fighters were included in the twelve heroes, two of whom
were the Moyne assassins, Eliahu Hakim and Eliahu Bet-Tsouri. This was controversial in Israel
as some people felt it was wrong to idolize and glorify assassination and death. According to Dr.
Udi Lebel, in Yair Shelag’s article ‘The good jailer” written for Haaretz, there was intent to
conceal the memory of the Olei Hagardom when David Ben-Gurion was the first prime minister
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of Israel. Lebel in the same article discusses this concealment as going as far as to remove the
mention of the Olei HaGardom from lesson plans and converting the prisons into everyday
places to prevent them from obtaining importance as sites of memory.90 In the same article,
Sheleg discusses that the change in the memory of the fighters of Lehi and Irgun shifted from
negative and condemning to significant when Menachem Begin came into power. Begin
“instead of following the tradition of giving his Memorial Day speeches at the country’s main
military cemetery, on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, [he] went to the cemetery in Safed, where the
first Oleh Hagardom, Shlomo Ben-Yosef, is buried.”91 Gideon Sa’ar, the Education Minister,
was convinced this program would take the teaching of these acts out of the history classes and
make them ideological.92 The idea to commemorate the twelve assassins, who were either hung
by the British, or committed suicide, continued into 2010. The twelve pre-state Jewish
underground fighters were grouped together under the title “Olei Hagardom” and the Knesset93
was set up to hold a special session celebrating those fighters that defied and attacked the
British.94 In yet another way of memorializing those that fought the British colonial rule, there is
a museum located on Haganahh Street called The Underground Prisoners Museum. It is
principally dedicated to those prisoners that the British kept in the old Citadel of Acre, originally
constructed during the Ottoman rule, but the members of Olei Hagardom that had been hung are
commemorated there.95
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On June 30, 2012, Yitzhak Shamir passed away at the age of 96. The London Times’
obituary on Shamir’s death focused on Shamir’s involvement in Lord Moyne’s assassination.
The article opens up with “Yitzhak Shamir, Israel’s long-serving Prime Minister, was also a
senior leader of the terrorist Stern Gang responsible for the assassination of Lord Moyne, the
Minister of State for the Middle East, and Count Folke Bernadotte96, the UN representative in the
region.”97 The article gives a clear run through Shamir’s life and background. It concentrates
more on his past actions and the history of the Stern Gang than on his actions as the prime
minister of Israel. The London Times decided to remember him as the one who had Lord Moyne
assassinated. Britain memorialized the memory of Yitzhak Shamir through the actions that killed
Lord Moyne. Shamir was alive for 96 years and accomplished many goals which include running
Lehi, being involved with Mossad and being Israel’s prime minister. But the lengthiest part of
the British article lingers on his actions taken in the 1940s. This speaks to the collective memory
that Britain cultivates in its citizens to remember the dastardly deed and the one person who lived
his life without being punished for involvement in an assassination.
The reaction to Shamir’s passing in the United States was timid compared to Britain. The
New York Times ran a long description of Shamir’s life with no particular focus on the Lord
Moyne assassination. It mentions that Shamir was one of the heads of Lehi in the 1940s; but
there is no emphasis on terrorism. In fact, the New York Times describes Shamir’s time in the
underground as “it [Lehi] began a campaign of what is called personal terror, assassinating top
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British military and government officers…”98 The paper steers clear from labeling Yitzhak
Shamir a terrorist.
The sharpest contrast lies between the British paper and the Israeli papers. In Israel the
eulogies and speeches that surrounded Shamir’s funeral were used to promote the image of the
seventh prime minister as a foundation to the state of Israel. One report says “Knesset speaker
Reuven Rivlin stated ‘you’ve carried the weight of this nation, its past and future, on your
shoulders.’”99 In addition, the Times of Israel’s article “Yitzhak Shamir laid to rest at Mount
Herzl” remembers Shamir as a fighter for Israel and does not mention the assassination of Lord
Moyne. Yitzhak Shamir has been remembered as simply the seventh prime minister of Israel but
that has been rare in his obituaries and eulogies. More often than not, the memory of Lord
Moyne’s assassination has been used to define Yitzhak Shamir. The memory of Lord Moyne has
been a constant in Shamir’s life as evidenced by his own writing and interviews. In 1975, Shamir
was the one who looked upon the bodies of the assassins, identified them and collected their
remains.100 With Shamir’s passing, people have still tried to use this specific memory to either
vilify or canonize him. Tracing from 1944, when the assassination took place to Yitzhak
Shamir’s death, the views of the Moyne Assassination have changed tremendously. Going from
Chaim Weizmann’s reaction of despair in 1944 upon hearing the news from Cairo to the eulogy
that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave in 2012 that stated “every act and decision he
[Yitzhak Shamir] made had to stand up to one test: whether it is good for the Jewish people and
the land of Israel.”101 The attitudes of how the assassination is viewed in Israel have shifted
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greatly over time, with perhaps the need to strongly define a national identity driving the
revision. Meira Weiss argues that nationalism builds upon the concept that a citizen would
sacrifice his/her own body for the larger ‘body’ or nation. This is often made evident in Israel
through the glorification and commemoration of those people who have made such a sacrifice.
Because Israel has been involved with many violent conflicts, beginning with the terror tactics in
the 1940s to the present day Arab-Israeli conflict, “the sheer number and frequency of war
casualties, bereavement and commemoration have a unique nationalistic significance.”102
TERRORISM
Looking at the sociological aspect of political assassinations as Ben-Yehuda does in his
book, Political Assassinations by Jews, this particular event of Lord Moyne’s assassination can
be deconstructed to a logical standpoint. Starting with moral implications, ‘murder’ is a term that
carries a negative connotation, as the Webster Dictionary defines: “the crime of unlawfully
killing a person especially with malice aforethought.”103 Murder usually involves motive,
however, but seldom a political motive. Assassination is defined according to Ben-Yehuda, “[an
act] focused not on the person attacked so much as in the manner of attack…it was
conceptualized to be a premeditated form of killing, committed by stealth or by lying in wait- the
opposite of a duel.”104 When considering the predetermined definitions of terrorism, as Robert E.
Goodin does in What’s Wrong with Terrorism?, there are manifold elements to consider. Is there
a comparison to the definition of unjust war? Is terrorism only committed against innocent
people or innocent civilians? Do they belong to a state? Are states/countries the only ones
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allowed to wage war? If the terrorists themselves believe they are at war (often the case), then
should the Geneva Convention be relevant to their actions? These factors must come into play
when trying to define which act does or does not fall under the definition of terrorism. Certainly
murder can be applied to both assassination and terrorism; however, the real defining factor lies
between terrorism and assassination.105
Goodin makes a distinction between old-school terrorism and contemporary terrorism
through the use of deaths of innocent people. He briefly discusses that while old-school terrorists
were more politically inclined and targeted specific individuals, using particular targets to
produce a political result. In the current atmosphere it is rather the use of innocent targets that
has become a major difference.106 Since the attack of 9/11 and the subsequent “War on
Terrorism”, Americans have been on high alert for this word and its meaning. While 9/11
changed the American perspective on terrorism forever by attaching race and religion to the
definition, it was not always so. Terrorism differs from assassination and murder because it is a
form of political violence. The people who induce the terror through an act, be it actual death
dealing or merely an empty building exploding, are making a political statement. The terrorists
do not often define themselves as such; usually the term “freedom fighter” comes into play.107
While the world of governments interacts through officials and laws which may lead to “police
actions” or war, those people or groups that commit terror see what they do as necessary.
Terrorism is reserved for those that believe this is their last resort for their goal to be
acknowledged. As Abraham Stern believed, the British did not belong in Palestine. He felt that
they were the oppressors and he had no choice but extreme actions in protest. There was no other
way to remove them from Palestine.
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The catchphrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” has been used to
reference many “terrorist actions”. This constant repetition of the phrase for decades is because
its meaning has remained relevant. Associated with a negative connotation, ‘terrorism’ is usually
the label given to the group opposing the one doing the labeling.108 Whereas the perpetrators who
have committed the action in question rarely refer to themselves as terrorists, rather something
along the lines of heroes. Churchill, the British and the Zionists were alarmed and upset by what
they considered a terrorist action. Yitzhak Shamir, Elaihu Bet-Tsouri, Eliahu Hakim and the Lehi
group were pleased that the assassination was successful because they saw the action as
necessary to their cause.
According to Whittaker, editor of The Terrorism Reader, “the terrorist is fundamentally
an altruist: he believes that he is serving a ‘good’ cause designed to achieve a greater good for a
wider constituency…which the terrorist and his organization purport to represent.”109 Abraham
Stern, as well as the Moyne assassins, had strong convictions that the British were the enemies of
the Jews. For inspiration he looked to the struggle of the Irish against Britain in the 1920s and
the anarchists in Russia in the 1880s. Stern developed an ideology for Lehi that compiled “the
ideals of Jewish nationhood and of armed struggle for national liberation and independence.”110
His logic stemmed from reasons such as since the British were not rescuing the Jewish refugees,
then they were collaborators of Hitler. Shamir argued that the Lehi, though considered terroristic
in nature, was more humane than Irgun. The Irgun, headed by Menachem Begin, performed
attacks on buildings, police stations and sometimes army bases, while the Lehi attacked one
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person. Shamir points out that killing random people makes less of a point than one person
chosen for political tactical reason.111
The British allowed the Jews to develop Haganah. Once the British acknowledged that
the Jews could have a militia, it was logical to have divisions between those in the group,
creating new groups. The emergence of the Irgun and Lehi occurred naturally because people
often have differences of opinion. The British may not have predicted that terrorism would result
from allowing Haganah to exist; however, it is not a stretch to move from a defensive position to
an offensive posture. The Jews and Arabs living in the British Palestine Mandate area resided in
a high stress situation where there were daily clashes over who the land belonged to. An overall
look at the situation in the 1940s shows that the Jewish Agency in Britain “commanded the
allegiance of virtually the entire Yishuv, had considerable financial resources both in Palestine
and abroad, controlled the 60,000-strong Haganahh militia.”112 This contrasted with the very
small support Lehi and Irgun were receiving from the population in Palestine.113
Terrorism as it applies to the assassination of Lord Moyne is debatable. Moyne’s life was
forcibly stripped from him with malicious intent. Interestingly, of the small selection of
newspapers used in this specific research, the Times Picayune (New Orleans, Louisiana) and the
Canberra Times (Canberra, Australia), were the first newspapers to use the word “terrorism” in
conjunction with this action. Picking up the story on November 8, 1944, the Times Picayune
headlined this story, “Blame Terrorists in Moyne’s Death.”114 The Canberra Times in Australia
caught up with New Orleans, when claiming that the killing of Lord Moyne “was committed by
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members of a Jewish terrorist organization.”115The London Times, while reporting this event, use
the term ‘assassin’ until Thursday, November 9, 1944, when they did report that the
“organization in question is the notorious Stern [Lehi] terrorist gang.”116 So what then
determines the difference between assassination and terrorism?
The Moyne Assassination certainly falls under the definition of assassination: killing a
target because of political causes. The notion of creating terror was certainly in the Lehi
program. This assassination did create terror in the Middle Eastern world; other British officials
were targeted later and there is still debate as to whether it affected the speed with which Israel
became an official state.117 Yitzhak Shamir has defended his decision to remove Lord Moyne
from the political playing field countless times: to his followers when the initial idea became a
reality; in his memoirs Summing up: The Memoirs of Yitzhak Shamir; and in interviews,
including one that was recorded in October 1993, Shamir states,
Moyne is a different story. First of all, Lehi is a different story. Lehi was not a part of the
Zionist movement, not a part of the Revisionist Party. It was sometimes something apart
and Lord Moyne was the highest British official in the Middle East …. and because we
fought against the British in this area, we took him for a target. This was the main reason
for his assassination.118
Yitzhak Shamir became the Prime Minister of Israel for two separate terms (1982-1983, and
1986- 1992). His past, having belonged to what was dubbed a “terrorist group”, was not held
against him when it came to politics. Eliahu Bet-Tsouri and Eliahu Hakim were reburied in
Mount Herzl Cemetery; Yitzhak Shamir passed away on June 30, 2012 at the age of 96 “…
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prime minister, freedom fighter, intransigent Zionist, was laid to rest nearby.”119 Buried in the
same cemetery as the Moyne assassins the three men are honored for their service in creating the
state of Israel with acts of terror.
CONCLUSION
Through the careful study of the reported events surrounding the assassination of Lord
Moyne by the Lehi in Cairo, Egypt, 1944, all roads leading to the assassination become clearer.
Through the lenses of those who called themselves freedom fighters, an understanding of their
motivation is possible. Terrorism is akin to war, seen by those who study it as a last resort.120
War is the last step after diplomacy fails and it is “merely the continuation of policy by other
means.”121 Terrorism is viewed as a last resort toward a political goal. Lord Moyne was at the
center from the start in collaborating with the British to help implement policy regarding
immigration of Jews in order to appease the Arab communities. There were Jews at the time that
fought for what they believed in, a Jewish State and a Homeland of their own. What the Lehi did
was considered terrorism in 1944. Lehi, Avraham Stern and Yitzhak Shamir were fighting for
freedom of their people in what was quickly becoming a post- colonial world after World War II.
As Shamir wrote in his autobiography “at the funeral [of Eliahu Hakim and Eliahu Bet-Tsouri],
the Government of Israel was represented and I delivered the eulogy.”122 With the founding of
Israel the assassins’ actions have been justified and honored by the Israeli Government. Today
we can study how the memory of the assassination of Lord Moyne has been used by both the
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British and the Israeli governments for present political purposes to continue to define the events
of 1944.
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Appendix
The Balfour Declaration
Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917
Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you. on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following
declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and
approved by, the Cabinet:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this
object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status
enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist
Federation.
Yours,
Arthur James Balfour

*Reprinted with permission by the JewishVirtualLibrary.org, “Balfour Declaration: Text of the
Declaration.” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/balfour.html (accessed April
2014).
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